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Abstract 
The overall economic situation of the world is facing a 
threat with a deep and prolonged recession as the 
consequence of the squeeze in the fiscal system which was  
triggered by housing mortgage crisis in the United States. 
The importunate financial ramification of the worldwide 
macroeconomic inequality smoothed the progress of the 
expansion of the housing fizz with the amplification of 
toxic assets that burst in September 2008 as many of the 
major investment and commercial banks and leasing 
institutions collapsed. This study aims to contribute in 
summarizing these events and the diffusion of this 
financial turmoil through the advanced economies like 
United States and the Eurozone to the developing 
economy of Pakistan. The paper analyzes specifically 
Pakistan’s current macroeconomic economic situation 
during this financial crisis. It also discusses the 
consequences of the surge in food and oil prices. This 
study also evaluates the government’s response to the 
deteriorating conditions and proposes a number of policy 
measures.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The recent crisis which swept through the global has done 
serious damage to the U.S. economy. The stock market 
collapse that took place on Monday, 29 September 
2008—a loss of 778 points off the Dow Jones Industrial 
Average (DJIA)—was the largest single-day loss in the 
history of the DJIA. In a single day, US$1.2 trillion of 
wealth, equivalent to nearly 7% of the market’s value, 
was wiped out. Globally, equity markets were hammered 
in the aftermath and the credit freeze has become severe. 
The seizure of credit was echoed by abnormal increase in 
the London Inter Bank Offered Rate (LIBOR)—the rate 
of interest banks charge one another for short-term 
(overnight) loans—which rose to an astonishing 6% in 
September. Commercial paper, usually regarded as a safe 
investment by money market funds, suddenly became 
risky as blue chip firms’ profit reports had worsened. 
Bankruptcy procedures involving large investment banks 
had also tied up funds of third parties. Then runs began on 
money market mutual funds that up till then had been 
regarded as akin to deposits in commercial banks. Loan 
windows suddenly were slammed shut. Credit became 
impossibly expensive as bank margins were exorbitantly 
raised, which forced the investors to look for cash and US 
Treasuries, to the point that interest on the latter 
approached zero. Understanding why this has happened 
and what the implications will be for developing 
economies especially Pakistan is the purpose of this 
paper.  
The paper begins in Section II by identifying the 
underlying fundamental causes of the collapse in the US 
after a credit crisis that took years in the making. The 
spread of the crisis from the US to the rest of the 
industrialized world, particularly Europe, is discussed in 
Section III. Section IV sets out the macroeconomic 
condition of Pakistan and its exposure to the current 
turmoil. Section V evaluates the government’s response to 
the deteriorating conditions and Section VI concludes the 
study with the recommendation of a number of policy 
measures 
 
2. Anatomy of the US Financial Crisis 
 
The monetary and fiscal policies are not only the 
underlying causes of the financial turmoil in United 
States, instead the week management of private lenders, 
irresponsible behavior of the borrowers. Also the 
availability of  plentiful and low-priced money made the 
housing bubble to expand for more than a decade. The 
decline in the housing prices became the contiguous basis 
of the recession in the US economy. However, if we 
consider the slump in housing prices in solitary, it is not 
possible to explicate the recent financial crises, since 
housing industry was showing the downward trend for 
about 2 years before crises. Elementary structural 
tribulations are obvious and needed consideration for the  
analyses of the turmoil and the evaporation of confidence 
that accompanied the recent credit crunch. The US 
macroeconomic fundamentals are indicative of the policy 
shifts that occurred just after the turn of the century 
toward fiscal and monetary excess and showed a 
persistent deepening of the US current account deficit.  
 
Figure 1: US Current Account Balance
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Source: US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis 
(2008). 
 
This reached the critical level of 5% of GDP or more than 
US$600 billion in each of the past 4 years to 2007. The 
component of the current account deficit that is explained 
by private investment in excess of private saving was 
partially offset by positive net government savings (fiscal 
surpluses in the consolidated government account) in the 
years 1998–2001 but since then the fiscal balance has 
deteriorated.  
Figure 2: US Consolidated Financial Balance
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Source: US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis 
(2008). 
 
In 2008 the consolidated US fiscal deficit is expected to 
surpass the US$400 billion mark. The degree of fiscal 
proclivity is reflected in net consolidated government 
borrowing ranging from over 2% to nearly 5% of GDP 
between 2002 and 2007 as a combination of tax cuts, war 
expenditures, and absence of any sacrifice of other 
expenditure categories resulted in cumulative borrowing 
of over US$2.5 trillion till 2007. 
 
Figure 3: US Consolidated Net Lending 
(Borrowing)
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Source: US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis 
(2008). 
 
The fiscal imbalance (government sector de-saving) is 
thus contributing to the rise in the current account deficit. 
The current account imbalance also reflects the decline in 
US private saving, which is largely attributable to falling 
household savings. Corporate private sector saving on the 
other hand has been relatively steady. 
Macroeconomic performance has deteriorated. Inflation 
as measured by the consumer price index (CPI) has 
exceeded 2% in each of the 5 years after 2002 and after 
rising close to 3% in 2007, jumped to nearly 5% in 2008  
Figure 4: US CPI Inflation Rate
0
1
2
3
4
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Year
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
 (
%
)
 
Source: US Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(2008). 
 
Real GDP growth has weakened and has topped 3% only 
once in the past 7 years a growth rate attained routinely in 
the period 1998–2000. Inflation rates now typically 
exceed GDP growth rates—another indicator that a loose 
policy environment has taken hold. Growth in 2008 is 
now widely expected to be the lowest since 2001 after 
negative growth in Q3 2008 of –0.5%. 
 
Figure 5: US Real GDP Growth
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 Source: US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic 
Analysis (2008). 
  
Money supply growth as measured by M2 (currency, 
demand deposits, time deposits, and money market 
mutual funds) grew continuously over the past decade. 
The expansion of broad money was benign as long as 
fiscal policy was restrained, as the surpluses of the 
consolidated governments (municipal, state, and national) 
afforded cope for non-inflationary credit growth.  
 
Fiigure 6: US Money Supply Growth
0
2
4
6
8
10
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Year
P
e
rc
e
n
ta
g
e
 (
%
)
 
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 
(2008). 
 
However, once tax cuts and outsized expenditures pushed 
the fiscal balance into deficit, continued easy monetary 
policy exacerbated imbalances and fueled a housing-led 
consumption binge that was financed in large part by 
borrowing abroad. 
The expansionary monetary policy stance that 
characterized the boom years after the 2001 dotcom 
recession is reflected in the sharp drops in nominal and 
real interest rates between 2001 and 2004. 
 
Figure 7: US Real Interest Rates
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Sources: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 
(2008); US Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(2008). 
 
Policy rates were negative in real terms for a period of 3 
years between Q4 2002 and Q3 2005, and after a brief 
interval of tightening between Q4 2005 and Q4 2006 were 
subsequently loosened thereafter, in response to the 
slowdown in economic activity turning negative in real 
terms again by Q1 2008. In 2008 the real policy lending 
rate fell sharply as the Federal Reserve (Fed) aggressively 
implemented a series of cuts, although this decline failed 
to alleviate the freeze in credit markets as the spread 
between policy and lending rates widened. With the boom 
in the housing prices in United States for more than a 
decade, there was a proportionate rise in the mortgage 
lending. This was indicated in the Case-Shiller Composite 
Index of housing prices, showing the continuous rise for 
almost a decade till the first half of 2006, after which it 
started to decline. 
 
Figure 8: US Housing Price Index
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Source: Standard & Poor’s (2008). 
 
The main reason for the provision of the sub-prime 
mortgage from many of the lenders was the consistent 
trend in the abnormal growth in housing prices.  
The peak in the housing price index and its growth 
coincided with the effects of loose monetary policy. The 
rapid expansion of base money (currency plus bank cash 
reserves) operates with an approximate 12-month lag and 
the overly expansionary policy fueled housing prices and 
peak growth in housing prices in 2004–2005. The easing 
in base money growth that began in Q2 2005 through Q2 
2008 had a dampening effect that is now apparent in the 
contraction in housing prices that started in the latter half 
of 2006. The subprime mortgages were packaged and 
securitized (with “triple A” ratings provided by credit 
rating agencies) and then were sliced and diced into 
derivative assets that provided the fuel to investment 
banks to develop the credit default swap (CDS) market on 
a global basis. The development of subprime lending led 
to the perverse trend of US homeowners defaulting on 
their mortgage payments at nearly the same rate as 
customers defaulted on their credit card debts. 
The credit freeze will be difficult to mitigate as long as 
financial institutions struggle to reduce leverage and 
restore minimum capital requirements. This becomes 
even more difficult as financial companies’ share prices 
continue to plunge to new lows and as customers cash out 
of money market funds and other investments. There are 
still some additional financial landmines that are waiting 
to be set off—hedge funds are even more highly 
leveraged than banks at up to 100:1 (Morris 2008). Credit 
card debt is another huge risk with defaults likely to erase 
the profits and capital of card issuers and their investors. 
Commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) are 
warehoused in banks amid fears that if marked to market 
there would be huge additional losses facing commercial 
banks (Morris 2008). Finally monoline insurers that have 
underwritten insurance policies for purchasers of 
securities such as municipal bonds are also facing 
potentially huge losses. Some of these insurers have in 
recent years expanded into mortgage-backed CDOs and 
are even more highly leveraged than the hedge funds. 
Thus, the turmoil in financial markets is far from over. 
 
3. The Spread of the Crisis to Financial 
Markets 
 
This section considers the exposure of various groups of 
countries in the Organization for Economic Co-operation 
and Development to the US meltdown. Housing bubbles 
in the United Kingdom (UK) and in parts of the eurozone 
became noticeable almost immediately after the subprime 
crisis began in the US in August of 2007. The large 
mortgage lender, Northern Rock, ran into funding 
difficulties in September 2007 and requested help from 
the Bank of England. Northern Rock had aggressively 
expanded its share of the UK mortgage lending from 
3.6% in 1999 to 9.7% in 2007 (Bank of England 2008) 
and had financed this expansion through securitization of 
its assets. In a situation of deteriorating credit and money 
market conditions, Northern Rock faced difficulties in 
meeting its debt obligations amid doubts about the value 
of its assets. Quickly the spread between its borrowing 
and loan rates plunged and Northern Rock approached the 
monetary authority for help. Liquidity support provided 
by the Bank of England could not save Northern Rock 
from bankruptcy, and in early 2008 the UK Government 
had to place Northern Rock under public ownership. 
 
3.1. The Eurozone 
 
Macroeconomic conditions in the eurozone appeared to 
be less precarious than in the US case. The current 
account balance has varied from small surpluses to small 
deficits, and fiscal balance is also much more comfortable 
than in the US case. Consumer price index inflation and 
growth have generally been more sluggish in the eurozone 
than in the US. 
 
Figure 9: Eurozone Current Account Balance
-2
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Year
%
 G
D
P
 
Source: CEIC Data Company, Ltd., downloaded 18 November 
2008. 
 
Figure 10: Eurozone Fiscal Balance
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Source: CEIC Data Company, Ltd., downloaded 18 November 
2008. 
 
Figure 11: Eurozone CPI Inflation
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Source: CEIC Data Company, Ltd., downloaded 18 November 
2008 
 
Figure 12: Eurozone Real GDP Growth
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Source: CEIC Data Company, Ltd., downloaded 18 November 
2008. 
 
3.2. United Kingdom 
 
United Kingdom also faced the same challenges as  by US 
because of rise in the fiscal deficit since 1998. The UK’s 
current account deficits however are smaller as a share of 
GDP than those of the US. Moreover UK real GDP 
growth has been close to 3% per annum and has exceeded 
the rate of inflation in most years in this century. 
 
 Figure 14: UK Fiscal Balance
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Source: Datastream, downloaded 18 November 2008. 
 
Figure 15: UK Real GDP Growth
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Source: Datastream, downloaded 18 November 2008 
 
Figure 16: UK CPI Inflation
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Source: Datastream, downloaded 18 November 2008. 
 
Inflation has reached new heights in 2008 and was a 
major reason why the Bank of England kept the policy 
rate relatively high at or above 5% over the period of Q4 
2006 to Q3 2008. It was only cut to 4.5% in coordination 
with rate cuts by other central banks after the global 
financial turmoil of late September and October 2008 and 
remained positive in real terms. Subsequent sharp interest 
rate cuts in November brought policy rates down to 3.0% 
with an effective real rate of interest near or below zero. 
Retailer's margins had crossed to double-digit rates for a 
stretched period (1998–2005) but were sharply lowered in 
2006–2007 before beginning to accelerate again in 2008. 
This growth had fueled the housing fizz that remained 
through in 2007 before it burst in Q2 2008. Housing 
market troubles spread more rapidly into the financial 
system in the UK with the Northern Rock failure 
discussed above. In 2008 the deepening of the housing 
crisis led to the collapse of the large mortgage lender 
Bradford and Bingley, forcing the UK Treasury 
Department to take over that institution. The UK 
government then moved quickly to inject large sums of 
new capital into the banking system, providing support to 
a number of large banks in an unprecedented move. These 
banks had yet to record subprime write-offs unlike their 
American counterparts. A clear sign that the UK is on a 
precipice is the sharp increase in LIBOR that occurred in 
late September and its widening spread over treasuries, 
reaching about 400 basis points (bp) Consumer debt in the 
UK is even greater than in the US relative to GDP and 
household income. Hence, the outlook is grim and a 
prolonged recession is as or more likely to be experienced 
in the coming 12–24 months. 
 
4. Macroeconomic Condition of Pakistan 
 
The GDP growth started to recover after the Asian Crisis 
in 1997, but again in 2001 it decreased significantly. 
Since 2002, it recovered, and especially between 2004 
and 2007 the economy registered high growth. 
 
Figure 17: Pakistan GDP Growth Rate
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Source: International Financial Statistics online (IMF 2008). 
 
The current account deficit reached more than 5% in 
2005/06 and 2006/07, and in fiscal year 2007/08 it 
reached 8.4% of GDP (over $14 billion dollars). 
Fortunately, current transfers and remittances made by 
overseas Pakistani workers are helping the current 
account deficit not to deteriorate further (in fact, the 
current account was in surplus during 2002–2004). 
 
Figure 18: Pakistan Current Account Balance
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Source: International Financial Statistics Online (IMF 2008). 
 
4.1. Exposure of Pakistan’s Macro-economy to 
the Financial Turmoil 
 
In this section, we explore the issue of the extent to which 
the current global financial turmoil rooted in the US 
subprime crisis has affected the financial stability of 
Pakistan. In Section III, we determined the spread of sub-
prime blow through Atlantic to many other developed 
economies in Europe. However, the financial system in 
Pakistan, on a whole, is unscathed by this  turmoil. By 
and large, the empirical evidence, which will be presented 
and discussed below, justifies this upbeat perception. The 
fundamental basis of relative immunity of the country’s 
financial institutions is that they have only a marginal 
exposure to the toxic assets (the sub-prime mortgages and 
related products), unlike their counterparts in advances 
economies. Although the impact of the global financial 
instability on Pakistan’s financial stability has been 
limited up to now, we should remember that the region as 
a whole has suffered a devastating financial meltdown of 
its own a decade ago. The most unswerving and core 
diffusion channels are through financial institutions and 
supplementary credit markets. Banks either directly or 
indirectly (investing in the foreign financial institutions 
which have high exposure, like Lehman Brothers) 
exposed to these toxic assets. Impact of the global 
financial instability on Pakistan’s financial stability has 
been limited up to now, we should remember that the 
region as a whole has suffered a devastating financial 
meltdown of its own in early 90's. 
 
  
4.1.1. Fuel and Food Inflation 
 
These global events have contributed to the worsening of 
Pakistan’s macroeconomic situation. On the inflation 
front the graph shows that between fiscal years 1997/98 
and 2006/07, Pakistan was able to maintain the inflation 
rate below 10%. Pakistan only experienced moderate-high 
inflation in the mid-1970s, over 25%, when the first oil 
price shock caused stagflation throughout the world. The 
figure shows that in fiscal year 2007/08, consumer price 
index (CPI) inflation breached the 10% level and reached 
12%. 
 
Figure 19: Pakistan CPI Inflation Rate
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Source: International Financial Statistics online (IMF, November 
2008). 
 
In 2008 high food prices and rising fuel prices brought 
inflation to double digits. In June 2007/08, inflation 
reached 21.5%. Inflation is caused primarily by increases 
in food prices, which represent 40% of the CPI basket. In 
June 2008, food inflation surpassed 30%. What is 
worrisome is that core inflation (i.e., excluding food and 
fuel inflation) is on the rise. There are fears that this may 
lead to a wage-price spiral. Although the largest 
contribution is provided by house rent, its share has 
declined, and in June 2008 it contributed slightly less than 
45% to total core inflation. On the other hand, during the 
last few months, the contribution of transport fare/charges 
has risen significantly. This reflects the pass-through to 
consumers of higher petroleum prices. The contribution of 
doctor’s fees, drugs and medicines, and washing soap and 
detergents to core inflation has also increased. Whether 
these increases are leading to workers’ demands for 
higher wages, which then feed into higher price increases 
is difficult to know as Pakistan’s statistical offices do not 
provide data on wages.  
 
 
 
 
4.1.2. Declining Foreign Exchange Reserves 
 
As a consequence of political uncertainty and economic 
deterioration (increasing external deficits and reduced 
capital inflows), foreign exchange reserves, which had 
been rising since 2001, started declining in November 
2007, and the deterioration in the overall reserve position 
has accelerated in recent months. From a total of $16 
billion (in liquid foreign reserves) in October 2007, 
reserves fell to $9.661 billion on December 31, 2008(a 
fall of more than 45%). The deterioration has been caused 
by rising imports of fuel and food products, increased 
outflows of portfolio investment, and use of foreign 
exchange reserves to defend the rupee. Inflows of 
overseas remittances are still holding and helping 
counterbalance the trade deficit. FDI is lower but is still 
significantly positive. It amounted to $3.88 billion during 
the first 11 months of 2007/08, as against $4.52 billion in 
2006/07. The decline is not excessive given that last 
year’s FDI was extraordinary (Ministry of Finance 2008). 
 
Figure 20: Pakistan Foreign Exchange Reserve
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Source: State Bank of Pakistan. 
 
4.1.3. Downgrade of Debt Rating 
 
As noted above, the consolidated government deficit has 
also deteriorated significantly from an already high 5% of 
GDP in 2005-2007 to 6.5% of GDP in 2007/08. In recent 
years, fiscal deficits have been financed significantly 
through borrowings from the State Bank of Pakistan 
(SBP). Both the SBP and the international financial 
markets believe that this monetization of the deficit 
contributes to inflationary pressures, although the 
empirical evidence is scant. Nevertheless, this is 
inconsistent with the SBP’s efforts to fight inflation. 
The political instability of the coalition government; 
increasing inflation; as well as the large trade, current 
account, and fiscal deficits led Standard and Poor’s (S&P) 
to downgrade Pakistan’s debt rating on 15 May 2008 
from B+ to B, and its long-term local currency rating 
from BB to BB-, signaling a negative outlook. The S&P 
Transfer and Convertibility Assessment rating on Pakistan 
also downgraded to BB- from BB (Business Recorder 
2008). Moody’s followed suit on 21 May 2008, and 
lowered Pakistan’s credit rating from B1 to B2 depicting 
increased economic imbalances and rising political 
instability in the country. The rating of domestic debt was 
also reduced to B2 (The Nation 2008). S&P and Moody’s 
have termed Pakistan a “highly speculative” country for 
bond investment. This pessimistic view from the 
international financial markets is reflected in the current 
year, which shows Pakistan’s sovereign credit spread 
(between the yield of the sovereign bond and the US 
Treasury bond of equivalent maturity) being not only 
much higher than of other emerging markets but also on a 
rising trend since May 2007.  
Today, international financial markets and credit rating 
agencies exert significant influence on economic 
outcomes. High inflation quickly brings in credit 
downgrades, loss of confidence, capital outflows, and 
reductions in capital inflows. 
 
4.1.4. Depreciation of the Rupee 
 
In late May and early June 2008 (during the period right 
after the credit downgrade and the announcement that 
inflation had reached 20%) the rupee fell fast from around 
66 to the dollar to almost 70. The exchange rate only 
recovered when the SBP intervened in the foreign 
exchange market and raised its discount rate by 150 basis 
points. At the year end the rupee touched 88 to the dollar, 
a 28% drop since the start of 2008. This prompted the 
SBP to issue a statement indicating that it would support 
the currency to ensure exchange rate stability. While 
defending the rupee will control imported inflation, the 
SBP is using its reserves and thus contributing to their 
depletion. Finally, the SBP has issued a temporary 
suspension of forward booking for all imports. It is 
difficult to assess the impact of this measure and how the 
private sector will react. 
 
5. Government Response to the Deteriorating 
Macroeconomic Situation 
 
The government’s response since May 2008 to the 
quickly deteriorating conditions can be summarized as 
follows: 
 
(i) The SBP reacted to the increasing inflation and to the 
depreciation of the rupee by raising the discount rate by 
150 basis points to 12% on May 23. It also increased the 
cash reserve requirement for all deposits up to 1 year 
maturity. In addition, the statutory liquidity requirement 
was increased by 100 basis points to 19% of total time 
and demand deposits. The SBP also enacted stricter rules 
on foreign exchange convertibility to end speculative 
foreign exchange trading (Dawn Internet 2008). 
 
(ii) The government has tried to show a more realistic 
stance by scaling down its GDP growth forecast to 5.5% 
for fiscal year 2008/09. This is still seen as too optimistic 
by some experts. The International Monetary Fund, for 
example, is projecting a 3–4% growth rate for 2008/09. 
The government also scaled up its projected inflation rate 
for 2008/09 to 11 %.  
 
(iii) The government has committed itself to during fiscal 
year 2008/09 to:  
(a) Reducing the fiscal deficit to 4.7% 
 
(b) Increasing the investment-to-GDP ratio to 21.5% 
 
(c) Reducing the current account deficit to 6% of GDP 
 
(d) Increasing foreign exchange reserves to $12 billion 
from the current level below ($11 billion) 
 
(e) Reducing the tariff rates of imported inputs of 
agricultural products, textile, pharmaceutical products, 
and other industrial products. 
 
The government’s response has failed so far to convince 
the credit agencies to reverse the country’s credit 
downgrade. The mood is still rather pessimistic as it is not 
clear how people will react once food subsidies are 
removed during fiscal year 2008/09, and consequently 
prices go further up. 
A major aspect of the government’s response to the 
current difficulties is the federal budget item changes 
from fiscal year 2007/08 to fiscal year 2008/09.  
Key to this budget is a proposed increase in revenues by 
20% and an increase in expenditures by only 7%. There 
will be a major reduction in expenditures on Economic 
Affairs, mainly reduction in subsidies. Overall, these 
changes are expected to lead to a reduction of 40% in the 
deficit. 
 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
The overall macroeconomic conditions of Pakistan 
showed remarkable progression through 2003-2007, 
derived mainly by the huge remittance inflow from 
overseas, cheep domestic lending rates, rescheduling of 
sovereign loan repayments, as well as FDI. This growth 
model although showed success during the initial stage 
but was not very persistent as it failed to address some 
major tribulations afflicting the economy of Pakistan. 
Some of these issues were; 
i) a shattered confidence level in the democratic setup of 
the country and an overall robust opinion of a flimsy 
government, which made unable to commence sturdy 
economic steps, like improved revenue collection 
measures, provision of income subsidies rather than price 
subsidies , and resolving the electricity and water dearth  
issue.  
ii) ignorance to the capacity building of the economy ( i.e. 
productive as well as technological advancements) and 
and  
iii) incapacity to restrict the escalating current account 
deficits. 
Similar to many developing economies which have 
employed dubious internal policies, exogenous shocks 
adversely affected the overall economy of Pakistan. The 
measures taken to cope up with these challenges like 
reducing demand by implementing recessionary route for 
supply side, were proved to be very short term strategies 
and showed no significant  contribution towards the 
improvement in the economic conditions. Too much 
austerity has compelled unnecessary reduction in  high 
yield investments in almost every economy, resulting in 
increased unemployment rates as well as divergence  in 
actual productivity. To achieve stability in the political 
structure is one of the key determinant among different 
modes of solution. Along with there is a need of strict 
fiscal and monetary policy measures. Similarly, the 
circumstances entail a synchronized attempt at the global 
level. 
By taking into account all these determinants, several 
considerations may impart reasonable solution to the 
problems faced by Pakistan's economy:  
 
(i) A consistent program to deal simultaneously with the 
macroeconomic imbalances and the rejuvenation of the 
economy.  
 
(ii) The stability of the political structure should be such 
that it can enforce: 
(a) implementation of progressive direct taxes for  
generation of higher levels of revenue; (b) changing focus 
towards income subsidies rather than the price subsidies; 
(c) look after critical economic resources while increase 
in poverty levels; and (d) allocate funds to manage the 
electricity and water shortages issue. 
 
(iii) To deal with the current account imbalances as well 
as the decreased foreign exchange reserves by focusing 
mainly on the increased levels of exports of the country. 
 
7. Recommendations 
 
In our view, and despite the looming risks, the after math 
of the Asian financial crisis in early 90's proved its 
inability to resolve the issues afflicting economic state of 
Pakistan.. Pakistan’s policy makers must aim at 
maintaining strong aggregate demand.  
The new government has to avoid at all costs setting 
overly optimistic GDP growth targets, as well as 
implementing populist economic policies. Its credibility is 
at stake. During 2007 and the first few months of 2008, it 
became clear that inflationary pressures, limited job 
creation, and the highly skewed nature of the income 
gains during the last few years led to the change in 
government.  
The government also needs to find a delicate balance 
between measures aimed at alleviating the impact of food 
and fuel inflation, and economic policies aimed at 
gradually redressing the macroeconomic imbalances. At 
the same time, it needs to devise and implement a long-
term growth model that leads to the transformation of the 
economic base from an agricultural and textile-dependent 
economy into a modern industrial and service economy. 
Furthermore, during the last few years, FDI inflows have 
concentrated on the service sector. However, the focus 
should be on attracting more FDI in production sectors. 
This transformation should also lead to the creation of 
productive and decent employment. This model requires 
an in-depth analysis of the possibilities of structural 
change and diversification in Pakistan. The years 2009 
and 2010 have to be dedicated to setting the foundations 
of this model, in which both private and public sectors 
must understand the role that they have to play. 
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